buylotrogold

[snip usual long idiot quoting] So now you have your ET shoulder sock puppet stalking me without you even trying to disguise the fact! You're truly are a creepy person. I'm with John on this one. It's unethical to feed into your illness. I wish you well..

[snip usual long idiot quoting] So now you have your ET shoulder sock puppet stalking me without you even trying to disguise the fact! You're truly are a creepy person. I'm with John on this one. It's unethical to feed into your illness. I wish you well.. For what it is worth, I for one appreciate the  provision of citations _link_s. One can choose to look at them or not, but they provide interest and   guidence for those of us who,  not making a study of the history of philosophy, have general interest in current theories. The same sort of general interest that, as a biological scientist,  I have in current theories in physics and mathematics. Areas that, along with philosophy, are beyond my expertise. Anyway, keep up the good work. Your efforts help to squash the nits and picks of that unpleasant piss poster who is seriously  confused about his  identity. Zinnic

Zinnic: For what it is worth, I for one appreciate the  provision of citations _link_s. One can choose to look at them or not, but they provide interest and   guidence for those of us who,  not making a study of the history of philosophy, have general interest in current theories. The same sort of general interest that, as a biological scientist,  I have in current theories in physics and mathematics. Areas that, along with philosophy, are beyond my expertise. Anyway, keep up the good work. Your efforts help to squash the nits and picks of that unpleasant piss poster who is seriously  confused about his  identity. Thanks for that. It's also worth noting that I'll often quote the text so that whoever is interested in the topic can respond to the quoted text rather than have to go to the _link_ed citation and pull back the text to discuss.

Today, the eliminativist view is most closely associated with the philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland, who deny the existence of propositional attitudes (a subclass of intentional states), and with Daniel Dennett, who is generally considered to be an eliminativist about qualia and phenomenal aspects of consciousness. One way to summarize the difference between the Churchlands's views and Dennett's view is that the Churchlands are eliminativists when it comes to propositional attitudes, but reductionists concerning qualia, while Dennett is a reductionist with respect to propositional attitudes, and an eliminativist concerning qualia. The Churchland stuff is again much ado over little: The right of a particular practice or discipline to describe what it researches with its own brand of interpretative conceptions and terminology. Dennett's claim, OTH, potentially borders on Kookville if he truly believes he is navigating around the countryside without the aid of visual, auditory, and tactile mappings composed of elements like colors, low and high pitches, haptic sensations, etc. This everyday scheme of being presented with such experiences has served humans since their evolutionary dawn, and who could even smoothly function if they had to switch to the over-technical complexity of this or that neuroscientific account? _

Eliminativism maintains that the common-sense understanding of the mind is mistaken, and that the neurosciences will one day reveal that the mental states that are talked about in every day discourse, using words such as intend , believe , desire , and love , do not refer to anything real. Replacing the everyday perception / conception of water with a chemical de_script_ion and a physics account doesn't eliminate what any of those lingual approaches refer to in their own manner. While words like beliefs, desires, etc, may refer to more abstract distinctions, they nevertheless symbolize collections of internal thoughts and feelings that are eventually witnessed concretely in terms of outcomes or behaviors. And this clamor over which is more epistemically real reeks of classic positivism: That science is the only real or valid knowledge, which is questionable from the standpoint that humans would have died-out millenia ago if the ways that modern science describes the world were the only effective conceptions of it. Also suggests an erroneous view that the sciences are extremely unified, when in fact the various fields have their own nomenclatures which are only tentatively bridged, with plenty of rivalry among them over which is more explanatorily robust than the others. The roots of eliminativism go back to the writings of Wilfred Sellars, W.V. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. IOW, it's descended from linguistic idealism , which was far more rightly applicable to Rorty than Sellars. On closer examination, Sellars didn't really deny there were experiential presentations that symbolic systems represented. It was just difficult or impossible for communal-_base_d epistemic endeavors to utilize such private appearings the way they did language, so that eventually you have some of those public discourses slash public procedures becoming skeptical and nihilistic about any personal presence of visual images, auditory and olfactory phenomena, etc. Today, the eliminativist view is most closely associated with the philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland, who deny the existence of propositional attitudes (a subclass of intentional states), and with Daniel Dennett, who is generally considered to be an eliminativist about qualia and phenomenal aspects of consciousness. One way to summarize the difference between the Churchlands's views and Dennett's view is that the Churchlands are eliminativists when it comes to propositional attitudes, but reductionists concerning qualia, while Dennett is a reductionist with respect to propositional attitudes, and an eliminativist concerning qualia. The Churchland stuff is again much ado over little: The right of a particular practice or discipline to describe what it researches with its own brand of interpretative conceptions and terminology. Dennett's claim, OTH, potentially borders on Kookville if he truly believes he is navigating around the countryside without the aid of visual, auditory, and tactile mappings composed of elements like colors, low and high pitches, haptic sensations, etc. This everyday scheme of being presented with such experiences has served humans since their evolutionary dawn, and who could even smoothly function if they had to switch to the over-technical complexity of this or that neuroscientific account? Yes it is hard to account for; especially when you have to use the very systems it's looking to eliminate to pass along the arguments. The way i look at is that for example pain does not exist. Sure we feel pain but there is no such thing as pain in the same sense that there is no such thing as red . It's overly simplistic to use terms like pain and red . I think thats the argument. So as things stand now, their only way forward is via science . As another example; they seem to believe that using folk psychology is primitive and corrupting.